Popoca-Garcia v. State Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 40777 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-28-2014
Popoca-Garcia v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
40777
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Popoca-Garcia v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40777" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4585.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4585





) NO. 40777 
Petitioner - Appellant, ) 
) BINGHAM COUNTY NO. CV-2012-200 
v. 









REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
HONORABLE DAVID C. NYE 
District Judge 
MARIA E. ANDRADE, ISB #6445 
NATHANIEL DAMREN, ISB #9225 
P.O. BOX 2109 









TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
LEGAL ARGUMENT ................................................................................... 1 
1. Mr. Murdoch's inconsistent explanations about the 
immigration consequences of the plea agreement fell below an 
objective level of reasonableness, rendering his representation 
deficient as a n1atter of law ...... " ........................ " ..... " .1 
II. Mr. Murdoch's inconsistent explanations prejudiced Mr. 
Popoca because it is reasonably probable that, but for Mr. 
Murdoch's lack of clarity about the immigration consequences 
of pleading guilty to the charged offense, Mr. Popoca would 
have understood that the plea virtually guaranteed 
deportation, and would have instead insisted on going to 
trial ......................................................................... 11 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................... 16 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page(s) 
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 262 P.3d 255 (2011) .................... 7 
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.s. 388, 68 S.Ct. 10 (1947) ............ 14 
Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 57 P.3d 787 (2002) ............. 13 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985) ..................... 13 
Immigration & Naturalization Servo V. St. Cyr, 533 U.s. 289, 
121 S.Ct. 2271 (2001) ........................................................ 13 
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 103 P.3d 460 (2004) ................ 13 
Missouri V. Frye, 566 U.s. _, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) ................ .5 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.s. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) ......... 2-3,6-8, 12-14 
State V. Favela, No. 32,044, 2013 WL 6038868 (N.M. Ct. App. 
Aug. 8,2013) ................................................................... 12 
State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d 163, 249 P.3d 1015 (Wash. 2011) ...... 9, 14 
Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) ....... .2-3, 13 
United State v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2011) ........ 12 
Young V. State, 151 Idaho 52 (Ct. App. 1988) ............................ 1 
Statutes 
8 U.s.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) ...................................................... 2 
I.C. § 18-1508 .................................................................... 14 
ii 
Rules 
LC.R. 11(d)(1) .................................................................... 11 
Professional Standards 
ABA Crin1inal Justice Standards, Defense Function 
Standard 4-3.8(b) (3d ed. 1993) .............................................. .4 
ABA Criminal Justice Standards, Pleas of Guilty 
Standard 14-3.2(a), (f) (3d ed. 1999) ........................................ .4 
IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.4 .......................... 3-5 
Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Assoc., Performance Guidelines 
for Criminal Representation, Guideline 6.3(a) (1995) .................. .4 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 20 (2000) .......................................................................... 4 
iii 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Petitioner-Appellant German Popoca-Garcia (hereinafter "Mr. 
Popoca" or "Petitioner"), having received Respondent's brief on appeal, 
herein files this Reply. 
Given its jurisdiction to freely review the application of the relevant 
law to the facts found by the district court, see Young v. State, 151 Idaho 52, 
764 P.2d 129 (Ct. App. 1988), this Court should find that the district court's 
determination that Mr. Popoca failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance 
of his trial counsel be deemed clearly erroneous because (i) the incoherent 
ntanner in which Mr. Popoca's prior attorney, Manuel Murdoch, 
communicated his advice to Mr. Popoca was objectively deficient as a 
matter of law, and (ii) Mr. Murdoch's confused communication of that 
advice prejudiced ~1r. Popoca. 
I. Mr. Murdoch's inconsistent explanations about the 
immigration consequences of the plea agreement fell 
below an objective level of reasonableness, rendering 
his representation deficient as a matter of law. 
Mr. Murdoch's performance was objectively deficient as a matter of 
law because the cumulative effect of his various inconsistent explanations 
to Mr. Popoca about the immigration consequences of the plea offer 
1 
amounted to confusing, inconsistent advice when the consequence of 
pleading guilty to the offense was crystal clear. The conviction for a sexual 
abuse of a minor offense is an aggravated felony under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, appearing third on the list of aggravated felonies in 
the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Neither the district court nor the 
parties to this appeal take the position that the consequence was unclear. 
(Respondent's brief, p. 6; R., pp. 53-54, 92.) As a result of the inconsistent 
and confusing mam1er in which he communicated his advice to Mr. 
Popoca, Mr. Murdoch failed to carry out his constitutional duty to provide 
clear advice under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). In 
this case, Mr. Murdoch was required to tell Mr. Popoca that it was virtually 
certain that he would be deported as a result of his conviction. By failing to 
clearly convey this advice, Mr. Murdoch violated his fundamental duty to 
clearly communicate to his client information necessary to meet his client's 
objective of avoiding deportation, thereby failing to provide 
constitutionally competent representation under the Sixth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court reached its decision in Padilla by applying the 
test for ineffective assistance of counsel announced in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. 
2 
Strickland, of course, requires an assessment of whether counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2052. Following the 
standard laid down in Strickland, the Supreme Court concluded that 
constitutionally effective assistance requires a defense attorney to 
affirmatively advise a non-citizen defendant about the immigration 
consequences of admitting guilt to an offense, and where, as here, the 
consequences of pleading guilty are clear, the attorney's affirmative advice 
must also be clear. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. 
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Padilla is consistent with, if not 
grounded upon, the attorney's fundamental duty to communicate with 
clients and keep them informed of decisions with respect to representation. 
Communication is essential to the very nature of the attorney-client 
relationship because the client trusts the attorney to work with the client to 
achieve a desired result. The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
expressly provide that a lawyer "reasonably consult with the client about 
the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished" and 
" explain a n1atter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to 
make informed decisions regarding the representation." IDAHO RULES OF 
3 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2), (b) (2004).1 See also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000). Sin1i1arly, the 
American Bar Association's Crilninal Justice Standards provide that 
defense counsel has a duty to keep the client informed about developluents 
arising in a case or plea discussion. See ABA Criminal Justice Standards, 
Defense Function (3d ed. 1993) Standard 4-3.8(b); ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards, Pleas of Guilty (3d ed. 1999) Standard 14-3.2(a), (f). Prevailing 
professional norms also provide that the duty to clearly and accurately 
communicate legal advice extends to an explanation of the consequences of 
a plea bargain. See Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Assoc., Performance 
Guidelines for Crin1inal Representation, Guideline 6.3(a) (1995) ("Counsel 
should inform the client of any tentative negotiated agreement reached 
with the prosecution, and explain to the client the full content of the 
agreement, and the advantages and disadvantages and the potential 
consequences of the agreement."). 
1 The commentary further clarifies: "The client should have sufficient information to participate 
intelligently in decisions concerning tl1e objectives of the representation and the means by which they are 
to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends 
in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when there is time to explain a 
proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before 
proceeding to an agreement ... The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client 
expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's 
overall requirements as to the character of representation." IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 
1.4 cmt. 5. 
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In the course of plea negotiations, J\1r. Popoca's central objective was 
to avoid a conviction that would trigger mandatory deportation. (R., pp. 6-
8.) An attorney's duty to clearly communicate with a client is intimately 
intertwined with the concurrent duty to generally abide by a client's 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and the means for 
achieving those objectives. See IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 
1.2(a),l.4(a)(2). The Supreme Court recently recognized the duty to 
communicate clearly in the specific context of plea-bargaining in Missouri v. 
Frye, 566 U.s. _, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). Justice Kennedy, writing for 
the majority, addressed defense counsel's duty of clarity in the context of 
conveying the terms of a plea offer, stating that the general rule is that 
"defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the 
prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable 
to the accused." Id. 
Although there is no dispute that Mr. Popoca wanted to avoid 
deportation, Mr. Nfurdoch's statements to the trial court and his assertions 
as to what he told Mr. Popoca about the immigration consequences of 
pleading guilty to the charged offense were anything but clear. Mr. 
Murdoch told the trial court in Mr. Popoca's presence that Mr. Popoca 
5 
could be deported, and likely ,vould be deported, but also that it was unclear 
whether he would be deported. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 7-10; p. 24, L. 25 - p. 25, Ls. 
1-6; p. 37, Ls. 18-21.) The only correct advice to give a Lawful Permanent 
Resident who is poised to plead guilty to an aggravated felony under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act is that the conviction will cause 
deportation. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. In Padilla, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that this is not a matter of semantics: where the consequence is 
clear - as it was for both the petitioner in Padilla and Mr. Popoca - precision 
matters, and an attorney must communicate to the client that a guilty plea 
will result in Virtually certain deportation. ld. 
The district court decision neither addresses the mandate that the 
attorney clearly comlnunicate to the client the immigration consequences of 
a decision to plead guilty, nor discusses whether Mr. Murdoch discharged 
this duty in light of his various inconsistent statements on this very point. 
Rather, the district court's decision, and the Respondent's appellate 
argument, hang upon only one of the many and various statements that 
Mr. Murdoch made about the immigration consequences: specifically, that 
at some point before entering the guilty plea, Mr. Murdoch managed to 
accurately characterize the immigration consequences of the plea offer. 
6 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 5-6; R., pp. 93-95.) In order to arrive at this 
conclusion, the district court and the Respondent rely upon Mr. tvfurdoch's 
statement at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that, before appearing 
at the change of plea hearing, he explained to Mr. Popoca that a guilty plea 
to the charged offense 'would result in the loss of his permanent resident 
status and deportation. (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 16-25 - p. 37, Ls. 4-6; R., pp. 93-94; 
Respondent's brief, p. 6.) However, Mr. Murdoch said other things, too. 
Mr. Murdoch admits that he equivocated in the advice he provided 
to Mr. Popoca- specifically, that he told Mr. Popoca that the immigration 
authorities /I could deport him for [the offense] and most likely would." (Tr., 
p. 37, Ls. 18-21.) (emphasis added). Although both the district court and 
Respondent suggest that Mr. Murdoch was appropriately disclosing the 
immigration authorities' opinion about the immigration consequences of 
Mr. Popoca's potential conviction, the relevant inquiry is whether Mr. 
Murdoch explained the consequence of the guilty plea under the law. (Tr., 
p. 37, Ls. 11-15; R., p. 94; Respondent's brief, p. 6.) Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 
612,619,262 P.3d 255, 262 (2011) (citing Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483). 
Neither the district court nor the Respondent directly engage with 
what Mr. Murdoch actually said on the record to the trial court (and in the 
7 
presence of Iv1r. Popoca) at the change of plea hearing: liMy client will most 
likely have some immigration consequences to this. And I've inforn1.ed him 
of this, that this could put his permanent resident status in jeopardy." (Tr., 
p. 11, Ls. 7-10.) (emphasis added). Mr. Murdoch also admitted at the 
evidentiary hearing that this was an incorrect statement of law. (Tr., p. 49, 
Ls.16-22.) While the district court acknowledged that this statement alone 
was not sufficient to inform Mr. Popoca that his deportation was virtually 
certain, the court did not consider the effect that this admittedly 
inconsistent and incorrect statement of law made in open court might have 
had on Mr. Popoca as he heard it. (R., p. 93.) 
The district court decision does not explain how Mr. Murdoch 
discharged his duty to tell Mr. Popoca that his conviction was virtually 
certain to cause his deportation in light of his admitted inconsistent 
statements to his client and the district court. (R., pp. 88-95.) Compliance 
with defense counsel's obligations under Padilla requires the provision of 
clear advice about clear consequences: that a guilty plea would result in 
deportation. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. Both the district court and the 
Respondents acknow'ledge this. (R., p. 94; Respondent's brief, pp. 5-6.) In 
light of the various other statements that Mr. Murdoch made about the 
8 
immigration consequences of Mr. Popoca's guilty plea, the district court's 
reliance upon only one of those statements to conclude that Mr. Murdoch 
discharged his constitutional duty to clearly explain to Mr. Popoca that his 
deportation was a virtual certainty was legal error. 
Since the Respondent did not address this undisputed erroneous 
statement by Mr. Murdoch, Petitioner herein restates his position: that Mr. 
Murdoch's hedging about the deportation consequences before the trial 
court at the crucial moment when Mr. Popoca changed his plea to guilty 
reflected Mr. Murdoch's own uncertainty about the consequences, and 
amounts to conflicting and confusing legal advice. Further, the cumulative 
effect of that conflicting and confusing advice deprived Mr. Popoca of 
meaningful representation by failing to inform him of the virtual certainty 
of deportation following conviction for the charged offense. Even if Mr. 
Murdoch did, as the district court found, provide correct advice at some 
tilne, that advice was nullified by the other statements made to Mr. Popoca 
and to the trial court that directly conflict with what Mr. Murdoch testified 
he explained to Mr. Popoca in private. See, e.g., State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d 
163, 173, 249 P.3d 1015, 1020 (Wash. 2011) ("The required advice about 
immigration consequences would be a useless formality if, in the next 
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breath, counsel could give the noncitizen defendant the impression that he 
or she should disregard what counsel just said about the risk of 
immigration consequences."). 
Although the district court correctly found that a violation of Padilla 
occurs, if at all, before the plea is entered, Mr. Murdoch's statements at the 
sentencing hearing are nonetheless relevant to determine his certainty 
about the advice he professed to have given Mr. Popoca about the 
consequences of a guilty plea. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Murdoch 
repeated his hedging about the deportation consequences before the court: 
[The prosecutor] said [Mr. Popoca] is going to be deported. It's 
premature to say that. We don't know. That's going to have to run 
through whatever proceedings immigration courts do. I do a lot 
of immigration lazv. And I can say that it's unclear at this point 
whether this 'luould actually result in a removal or not. 
(Tr., p. 24, L. 25 - p. 25, Ls. 1-6.) (emphasis added). Either ~1r. Murdoch 
was uncertain about the legal consequences of the conviction, or he was 
certain but neglected to express his certainty to the trial court. This post-
hoc statement is relevant because the plain meaning of Mr. Murdoch's 
explanation to the court continues to reflect his uncertainty regarding 
deportation consequences. 
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II. rvir. Murdoch's inconsistent explanations prejudiced 
Mr. Popoca because it is reasonably probable that, but 
for Mr. Murdoch's lack of clarity about the immigration 
consequences of pleading guilty to the charged offense, 
Mr. Popoca would have understood that the plea 
virtually guaranteed deportation, and would have 
instead insisted on going to trial. 
The Respondent argues that even if Mr. Murdoch's representations 
may be considered deficient, there is no actual prejudice to Mr. Popoca on 
account of that deficiency because, during the plea colloquy, he answered 
in the affirmative when the trial court asked if he was aware that he could 
be deported as a consequence of his plea. Given Mr. Popoca's affirmative 
response to the trial court's inquiry, the Respondent maintains that Mr. 
Popoca's subsequent sworn statement in his post-conviction petition that 
he would have taken his case to trial to avoid deportation amounts to 
nothing more than mere retrospective dissatisfaction. (Respondent's brief, 
p.7.) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d)(1) requires the trial court to inform all 
defendants entering a guilty plea or making factual admissions during the 
colloquy that the entry of the plea or the admission of certain facts could 
have the consequence of deportation if the defendant is not a citizen. LC.R. 
11 
11(d)(1). \Vhile warnings fronl the trial court about possible immigration 
consequences may playa useful role in stimulating a conversation between 
defense counsel and the defendant about those consequences, court 
advisals during the plea colloquy can neither substitute for competent 
advice from defense counsel, nor cure the prejudice flowing from counsel's 
failure to advise about those consequences, because the Sixth Amendment 
obligation of competence is a duty owed by defense counsel. Padilla, 130 
S.Ct. at 1482, 1486. See, e.g., State v. Favela, No. 32,044, 2013 WL 6038868 
(N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 8,2013), cert. granted, (N.M. Oct. 18, 2013) (No. 34,311) 
(trial court's advice to defendant about immigration consequences at plea 
proceeding does not cure failure of defense counsel to provide detailed 
advice about such consequences). Cf United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 
F.3d 1237, 1240-41 (9th Cir. 2011) (failure of trial court to accurately inform 
defendant of immigration consequences of guilty plea during colloquy was 
not prejudicial error). 
The central focus in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must 
be on the prejudice arising from counsel's deficient performance, see United 
States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir. 2012), and the legal standard 
for evaluating prejudice requires that Mr. Popoca show a reasonable 
12 
possibility that, but for Mr. :tY1urdoch's deficiency, he would have 
withdrawn his plea and insisted on going to trial, and that such a decision 
would have been rational under the circumstances. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
u.s. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985); Gilpin-Grub v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82, 
57 P.3d 787, 793 (2002); McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 851, 103 P.3d 460, 
464 (2004); Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1485. This standard of proof is "somewhat 
lower" than the common /I preponderance of the evidence" 
standard. Strickland, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
Petitioner herein submits that his dissatisfaction with Mr. Murdoch's 
representations in his criminal proceedings is not merely retrospective 
because Mr. Murdoch's failure to accurately and consistently communicate 
the consequences that would inexorably flow from the entry of a guilty 
plea frustrated the central objective sought by the Petitioner in the course 
of representation-avoiding mandatory deportation. Not only does Mr. 
Popoca swear that he would have rejected the plea offer had he known 
about the guaranteed deportation consequence (R., p. 8.), but Mr. Murdoch 
also stated that Mr. Popoca's immigration status "was a big part of our 
discussions" when they discussed the plea agreement. (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 21-
25.) See also Immigration & Naturalization Servo V. St. Cyr, 533 U.s. 289, 
13 
322, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (2001) ("There can be little doubt that, as a general 
matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea 
agreement are acutely aware of the irnn1igration consequences of their 
convictions."). 
If Mr. Popoca were convicted after trial for the charged offense of 
Lewd Conduct with a Minor under Sixteen, he would have faced a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment. I.C. § 18-1508. However, Mr. 
Popoca had earned permanent residency and made the United States his 
home; although he would have risked a longer prison term by going to 
trial, the deportation consequence of his guilty plea is also" a particularly 
severe 'penalty.1f' Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. For criminal defendants, 
deportation, no less than prison, can mean "banishment or exile," Delgadillo 
v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-91, 68 S.Ct. 10 (1947), and" separation from 
their families," Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1484. Given the severity of the 
deportation consequence, Mr. Popoca ,,y'ould have been rational to take his 
chances at trial. See, e.g., Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d at 175-176 (defendant's after-
the-fact statement that he would have rejected plea and gone to trial 
despite facing a maximum life sentence deemed rational under the 
14 
circumstances). Therefore, Mr. Popoca has proved that his counsel's 
unreasonable advice prejudiced him. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court vacate the dish-ict 
court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand 
this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 28th day of January, 2014. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of January, 2014, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by 
causing to be placed a copy thereof in the u.s. Mail, addressed to: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
Criminal Division of the State of Idaho 
700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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